It is in this context that answers to two probing questions must be sought –
1. What are the causes behind the emergence of political families, and why do they remain resilient for so long?
2. Is this an indicator of a weak political system where politics is dominated by famous last names rather than strong institutions?

Definitive answers may be difficult to find, but I proffer some explanations that would make the underlying issues easier to understand.

Causes and reasons for resilience

At the outset it is important to understand that political dynasties abound in other democracies as well. One may look to the famous American political families – the Adams’, Kennedys’ and the Bushs’. England is also not immune. Harold Macmillan’s cabinet in the 50’s had 11 members who were related to each other. Closer home – Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh all have famous families in political limelight. Dynasties in areas other than politics are perhaps more tenacious. Business dynasties are too common to be named. Dynasties exist even in some of the more “merit” driven professions. Of course the fact that dynasties are ubiquitous is not by itself reason enough to say that “dynastic politics” is to be assessed on the same terms or even that this a good thing, but it still goes to show that this is neither unique to India nor to politics.

There are two main reasons that can explain the causes behind and the reasons for “dynastic politics”. The first applies to dynastic politics generally, but the second is uniquely Indian –

First, to speak the language of economics – a political career requires enormous start up outlays. Although there are laws which limit spending by candidates, in practice it is often found that the actual costs to contest and campaign for election to a seat is very high. Further, despite substantial investments, the returns are unpredictable, risky and more importantly, uniquely binary. Either you win or you lose. A candidate’s loss by the narrowest of margins is as much a loss as everyone else in the fray. Only those who can afford to lose the time and money and have the requisite resources find an entry into what is often an exclusive if not a closed club, are able to afford this profession. Political lineage helps facilitate this entry.

Second, one may conceive of politics as being built around ideology. In western democracies political parties can be categorized on their different approaches to economic and social policies. The divide between the Tories and Labour in the UK or the Republicans and Democrats in the US can be explained by their positions on economic and social issues. In India however, apart from some exceptions, politics revolves around identities. Take the case of caste – Brahmins, Yadavs, Dalits etc; religion – Hindus and Muslims; regional identity – Marathas and non-Marathas; lingual identity – Tamils and non-Tamils etc. In a political culture that accords primacy to identities, political parties are equated with the identity and the will of a few powerful personalities. Political families become established brands having a high recall value and the faithful hope to find spiritual continuity with family heirs becoming political successors. For a voter used to voting on the lines of identity, a family pedigree provides legitimacy (to the candidate) and convenience (to the voter) at the time of choice.

Are political dynasties an indicator of weak political institutions?

A stock argument made by supporters of dynastic politics is that the public would ultimately assess the merit of all candidates at the time of voting. Dynasty may provide a party ticket – it cannot confirm success at elections. Even if one does win, a family name casts a heavier burden upon the politician to live up to such name and legacy. The bigger the brand, the bigger the expectations. One may, at some level, sympathise with these views. The question however is not whether dynasties are necessarily incompatible with democracy – the numerous examples in other, more mature, democracies suggest that they are not – but rather, is voting on filial lines a good thing?

I think a system that assesses a candidate on the basis of their pedigree alone and one that prioritises filial identity (or any other ascriptive identity for that matter) is a mark of a weak political institution. A system in which political parties are treated as extension of a few families, also marks a serious lack of internal democracy. Of course, democracy is based on the principles of “choice”, and one may choose to vote based on any criterion. A democracy allows me to vote for X not because I think X will be a good administrator, but because I have voted for X’s father, grandfather or great grand father. This thinking is defensible in a democratic framework, perhaps it may even be said to be “rational”, but it surely is not a good thing. Voting along lines of identity stifles innovation and emergence of new ideas and encourages divisive politics built around patronage. It prioritises identity over policy, divisiveness over governance, continuity over change and alienation over inclusion.

Conclusion

There is no necessary incompatibility between democracy and dynasty. However a system of politics that values filial identity as a measure of merit needs amends. Given the current system, it is more likely than not that the harbingers of change to the present political order would be products of a political dynasty. By itself this should not be a reason to discredit their achievements or intentions. Indeed this would be much welcomed.

Let me advance, though somewhat cautiously, two main concerns that I have against this move.

Census is not the right mechanism for this study

Caste as a political category is unique. Unlike perceptible identifiers like colour or race – caste is a product of self-categorization and depends largely on people’s perception of themselves. For this reason, it is also not static. Since the 1931 census, there has been over two-three generations of fission, re-location, and adoption of new rituals amongst social groups. The Census is designed to collect observational data, and not information based on the perceptions of the respondents or self-categorisation. A demographic exercise which is targeted towards collection of observable data, cannot be transformed to a social science fieldwork. Besides, India is home to a humungous number of sub-castes with nomenclature variations across regions. Census officials are simply unsuited to note the various nuances which are present within the various castes. To give an example – the Gonds of North Karnataka have nothing to do with Gond tribals of Madhya Pradesh. Another example – in south Gujarat a person may describe himself as a Matiya at the village level, a Koli at the taluka level and a Kshatriya at the state level. There are many such local peculiarities. Professor Ghanshyam Singh of JNU has done some research on these issues and his paper can be accessed here. There is also a thorough article by Asha Krishnakumar in the Frontline (access here). This exercise is simply not possible at a national scale – it has to be localized and requires careful study by social experts.

There is yet another concern that needs to be kept in mind. There are many benefits that accrue to particular castes based on their treatment by the State. Reservation programmes in India provide benefits based on caste identity. These have the effect of exaggerating the difference between a favoured and an unfavoured caste, though they may be economically similarly situated. It is trite that data collected from the Census will form the basis for formulation and modification of existing State policy relating to Caste based programmes. Absent a corresponding threat of a sanction and given the huge institutional advantage in distorting the census figures, there is a big incentive to cheat.

Transforming social and political identifies

Official classification does not merely reflect social identities but has a role in transforming them. A process of categorization necessitates definition. It also entails order and rigidity. Individuals find themselves firmly fixed as members in various groups of a particular dimension and substance – as defined by the State. There is an excellent article by Kenneth Jones on “Religious Identity and the Indian Census” (access here) which details the impact of the British Census on religious identity in India. He argues that the census had a role, apart from merely providing statistics, in bringing religious identity to the forefront of national politics in British India. It is most likely that this will be repeated for caste identity as well.

It can of course be argued that caste-based classification is enshrined in the Constitution and has been institutionalized in the current system of reservations. If however we are committed to a caste-less society, this move will only perpetuate it. It will cement a caste based political agenda for at least the next decade or two. Ajay Maken circulated an impassioned letter to young MP’s across party lines arguing against the collection of caste data in the Census. The letter can be accessed here.

Conclusion

The Census presently collects data on SC’s and ST’s and has been doing so since 1951. However, collection of data relating to all castes is a different exercise. Presidential lists of SC’s and ST’s has been prepared by the President, and these categories have, at some level, become “objective”. This is not the caste with the other castes which remain amorphous, diffused and fluid.

As a mechanism for the collection of a nation-wide caste data the census is likely to – miss out on the many local nuances, provide an incentive to cheat to the participants and establish a caste based political agenda as the future of the country.

Perhaps we need to think more carefully about where this move is going to lead us.

In political and security terms, the absence of a central nerve system to the protests means that neither the usual placatives – of dialogue and special envoys – nor the usual threats –of arrests and gag orders – will work. A popular leaderless struggle also marks a widespread discontent amongst the people with the State machinery. Such mass disobedience represents a big failing of the State and must be taken seriously in any democracy, and especially so in one as fragile as Kashmir. The Indian government must realize that although its case for Kashmir is strong, like any democracy, its legitimacy lies in the goodwill of the mass of the people.

If Kashmir is an integral part of India – which it is – it must be treated like one. While the government has to maintain law and order, the handling of the current protests displays use of unreasonable and excessive force. In fact, the immediate reason for the current situation was the death of 17-year old Tufail Mattoo, who was killed by a tear gas canister that struck him during a protest in Srinagar. Since then there have been more than 60 deaths, with most of them due to use of disproportionate crowd control measures. Police have admittedly resorted to use of live ammunition against civilian protestors – a measure which would not even be contemplated had the police been required to act in any other part of India.

The State’s actions in Kashmir also demonstrate a serious lack of empathy. In no other place in India would a bandh be looked upon with so much suspicion. Bandhs and political rallies are routine in our country – from Bengal to Kerala this is normal – and are indeed the mark of a healthy and vibrant democracy. Why then is a bandh in Kashmir treated differently? One reason for this is that Pakistan still clouds our policy in Kashmir – which is why any form of political dissent in Kashmir is viewed as an act of treason. The State must realize that when the people of Kashmir take to the streets, Pakistan is not even on their minds. They are agitating for rights as citizens of India – a right which is presently viewed with suspicion in New Delhi – just because it is being exercised in Kashmir.

Putting more police on the streets to shoot unarmed protesters cannot, and must not, be the answer. The unique character of our democracy has managed to accommodate, even if somewhat messily, the interests of various ethnic, linguistic and religious groups that comprise our country. To win the hearts and minds of the Kashmiri people – and transform the character of the valley into a mature democracy – dissent must be welcomed and not muzzled.

At the heart of the trouble is the failure of the government to recognize that with militancy no longer at the scale it was two decades ago, Kashmiris are legitimately questioning the continued existence of an intrusive State apparatus. New Delhi has fallen into the habit of not treating Kashmir as India or Kashmiris as Indians. The present violence in Kashmir is neither inexplicable nor insoluble. The cry for ‘azaadi’ is a response to this politics of alienation. It is a cry for inclusiveness – and the Indian State would do well to pay heed to it. The first step must start with an acknowledgment that the people of Kashmir have legitimate grievances and genuine aspirations – and as citizens of the country they are entitled to air them and demand their resolution.

Kashmir has been alienated for too long in the name of security – politics of inclusiveness will involve a leap of faith by the entire nation. This is the only solution to this litany of violence.