So lets come back to the question of contingency. You say that it is *because* religious beliefs are vulnerable that they should be afforded special protection. One, not all religious beliefs are vulnerable. I find it hard to believe that Hinduism is vulnerable. Moreover, ordinary moral beliefs are as vulnerable if not more. Atheism?

But how does vulnerability relate to *greater* freedom (because the state allows greater freedom to be exercised)? I would imagine vulnerability would translate into ensuring that no one may stop a religious institution from creating an educational establishment in its own name. Interpersonally, this is dealt with the harm principle. If between state and citizen, the state must simply allow them to do so. And this maybe constitutionally mandated. But why is that denied to everyone else? That is my question. Greater protection need not mean that greater freedom be allowed to be exercised, but rather that restrictions are imposed on every other institution and person from interfering with the exercise of that freedom. The connection between greater protection and the special rights of A. 25 and A. 26, where there are any, is tenuous.

The area of free action guaranteed in the constitution cannot be greater for some moral beliefs and not for others.

1.Of course the justificatory link I am forging here between religion and special protection to it is contingent. But what is the problem in this link being contingent. Horses for courses. If tommorrow people are attacked for their ideas on Ethics, protect them as well. Lurking beneath your discomfort with this justificatory link being ‘merely’ contingent is the thought that a real justification has got to be true, non contingently- true for all times and all places. But most moral problems are contingent in this way depending for thier very existence on the vagaries of life. I have moral obligations as a father only if I have a child; but how does this contingent fact of fatherhood detract from the nature of the moral requirement.

2. I think you are wrong to argue that people are not freer to follow religion than other belief systems. No Constitution can give someone the freedom to do something.; it can only either protect the freedom or take away the freedom. It cannot enlarge it. ( Hohfeld, Kockureck)You are free to do what you have the natural capacity to do.
Your objection can be restated thus:
People have greater protection for thier religious freedom than they have for freedom concerning other moral beliefs.
But this on my argument is unobjectionable. There is a need for greater ‘protection’ because there is greater vulnerability in case of religious beliefs. There would be a problem if the state discriminates between the vulenrability regarding religious belief and other vulnerabilities. How can you say that the issue of vulnerability is neither here nor there? It is the clincher in this case according to me.
3. I fail to understand your disticntion between religion vs religion as a social practice. Constitutions are practical documents. They concern what is happening. An extinct religon practiced by no one needs no protection. The protection that you are objecting must then actually pertain to the ‘practice’ of religion. The issues I underline those are those concerning the practice of religion.

The question about religious violence is irrelevant. That is covered under the harm principle, as I mentioned in the post.

I must have said something really misleading in the post that so many people have ended up saying the same thing.

Well, I consider 3 points
1. That religion has no special epistemic status as opposed to other moral beliefs. Any distinction on this *reason* is arbitrary.
2. If that is so, the only reason for granting minority religions and or any religion for that matter, *greater* freedom, than other world views, like secular humanism for example, must be because it is a *contingent* feature of societies that religion is a hot-button topic. I emphasized that there is a distinction between religion qua religion, and religion qua social practice.
3. However, that it is a hot-button issue, in my view, cannot bear enough justificatory load to justify *special* protection to religion. People are of course free to follow their religion. But what grounds the fact that people are freeER to follow religion as opposed to something else? Suppose a majority of persons (non-religiously) think that persons from certain religions should not be allowed to build prayer houses, and only secular places of congregation may be built. This might be a hot-button and people may be (over) sensitive to attacks on their secular moral belief. And that a particular law makes this the case. In my view, I would think this manifestly wrong. There is nothing to privilege secular moral belief over religious belief, even if it is hot-button.

You and I both agree on justificatory pluralism, but I don’t think hot-button really cuts it.

What makes a religious belief privileged over non religious beliefs? Ontologically and epistemologically perhaps nothing does. May be the Kantian world view deserves just as much respect as the Christian one.

But does this mean that the Constitution morally ought to treat them alike? Consider this: How many Kantians have killed Platonists or demanded a State of their own. Each of these things have happened and continue to happen in the name of religion. Religion is a highly emotive subject and stirs enormous popular passion. Thus there has been felt the need to provide a (Constitutional) guarantee that people are free to follow the religion of thier choice, or not follow any . The ‘justification’ comes not from the privileged status of religious belief but the vulnerability that its brings along with it. If you consider vulnerability as the justificatory basis it helps explain the special status acorded to ‘race’ and in some cases ‘language’ as well.

Doesnt this ‘justification’ satisfy you? Or are you committed to a view that the ‘justification’ could be a proper one only only if it is tied to some special ontological or epistemological priority of the belief in question. What if someday Humeans in some country start getting systematically attacked by the Aristotelian majority of the country and are forced to convert at gun point to Nichomachean Ethics? Should such a day arise I think there you will find the justification to afford privilege to peoples beliefs on Ethics as well.

I think I have irked all three of you by using the the words “the state must have something to say about religion.” I must clarify what I meant. I *do not* mean that the state must interfere in religion. My post is not about the interface of state and religion. When Alok says, “I think that unless religion intersects with another consideration of public policy, it is none of the business of the State. To this extent I agree entirely with Vipul above.” I agree. I really had nothing to say about that.

When I used the word care, it is true that these may be a variety of responses. But in my post I emhpasized that all liberal states must adopt a policy where they allow persons to practise their religion – which is what I meant by positive commendation. The state must say, it is good for you to practise whatever helps your well being. And since religious belief is part of your well being, please go ahead. We will not stop you. So when a state does not stop a person from practising her religion, it ‘would’ have shown that care towards the issue, it would have something to say about the issue. That is the whole point about conscience. States must abstain for interfering with the conscience of persons. Strangely we are all in agreement. But it maybe that my words have misled all of you.

About the question of political compulsion – of course. I agree. We can’t look at stuff without a politico-historical context. But we can still, surely, say that it is manifestly unfair that politico-historical circumstances have led to differing treatment of certain types of matters of conscience (religion). I have for long failed to understand the difference between principles and pragmatic “justifications”. I am on dworkin’s side when he says that pragmatism must itself be the product of a certain philosophical view. Pragmatism is not separate from the domain of normative justification. Thus, in my view, and in this case, politico-historical justification just doesn’t cut it. There are absolutely “ridiculous” things in the constitution. “Cow-slaughter”? Politico-historical justifications would tell you that at that time, Gandhi’s influence was so great, and that Hindu’s thought it such a great and important issue that it’s being there in the Constitution is justified. I am not inclined to take such a view.

This is a slight aside to the debate you’ve been having with Vipul.

You cannot, as Alok says, look at the issue of religion in the Indian Constitution de hors the political compulsions that got them there in the first place. As a “categorical practical demand” I agree with you entirely that it has as much or as little moral significance as say your non-religious moral belief. To that extent, both should be equally protected or kept immune from state interference legally.

In the Constitution, this leaves us with two problems: one that religion as a category is protected and two, of special cultural and educational rights for religious and linguistic minorities. Why religion and language you may ask? Why not gender, province or skin colour? But the question of constitutionalisation is not a question of personal morality alone. It is myopic of you to think that this is the whole story. It is not. Constitutions are the practical products of political give-and-take responsive to issues and concerns that dominate at the time. Religion and language were deemed key markers which could either make or break India at the time. Maybe sometime in the future, sexuality or more probably, economic inequality may be substitute markers. And the Constitution at the time will respond appropriately to the same. So is the place of religion morally justified- no, but subject to the caveat of how narrowly you want to view morality itself. Is it practically justified- most certainly yes.

There are many reasons why a liberal state may care about someone’s religion. It also depends on what you mean by “care”. Care can range from “nice to know, keep it up” to “it’s not our culture to be doing these things. Stop now!”.

For the moment we can ignore the intersection between religious and non-religious matters where the State’s interest in religion is balanced (or perhaps over-weighed) by interest in something other, i.e., public health.

But this does bring back the question, why should a modern liberal State care about a citizen’s religion?
I think that unless religion intersects with another consideration of public policy, it is none of the business of the State. To this extent I agree entirely with Vipul above.

I also think that you cannot look at India’s Constitutional provisions de hors Indian political history. Briefly, the provisions you suggest are problematic are actually in place to promote diversity of linguistic and religious groups and to allow such groups to maintain their unique linguistic and religious traditions in the area of education.

I presume you have some sort of hybrid in mind, that includes some conception of fundamental/inalienable rights (libertarian), some concept of making sure there isn’t too much inequality (egalitarian), and some idea of maximising overall prosperity (utilitarian). It’s the libertarian component that provides the strongest objection against the interface of state and religion. The others don’t offer any strong support for state involvement with religion, but don’t offer any particular opposition either, at least at first blush.

Let me allay your concern by saying the following: I believe that there there is no better defense of the modern state than on liberal grounds. If a state is “libertarian,” it’s legitimacy, I believe, is far more prone to attack.

Perhaps the use of the the word necessary was unfortunate. I regretted using it after I first typed the post but I hung on. For one reason. If we think that the only legitimate state is a liberal one (and of course there may be other state although not legitimate – a state can exist without being legitimate) then a state that does not promote the well being of its members would perhaps be classified as a failing state.

I will leave the debate of what it means to promote well being for another day. I just think that one necessary but not sufficient part of promoting well being is to allow people to fulfil their life plan. We can argue about what which part of one’s life plan but that again, is for another day. I think that at least one part of one’s life plan is to act according to what we believe moral imperatives are.

I emphasize that I have not understated the case against government involvement. This is a question of rights. It is almost axiomatic that where there is a right, government involvement is circumscribed.