Jay Panda, Restoring the House, The Indian Express, 6.12.11

Arghya Sengupta, Liability Rules Leave Very Little Recourse, The Hindu, 1.12.11

Huma Yusuf, In the Realm of Fear, The Dawn, 5.12.11

Bruce Riedel, A New Pakistan Policy, The New York Times, 14.10.11

In a country where most things, from the wearing of helmets by pillion riders on a motor-bike to the fare charged by the auto rickshaw-wallah are intensely political and politicised in nature, it is shocking that the supposed fount of India’s democratic politics, the Parliament, seems to be in permanent paralysis. Given this state of our nation, this political round-up focuses in equal measure on the politics of everyday life in India, the non-politics that characterises the nation state and on Pakistan, which, one hopes, can rediscover some hidden reserve of democratic politics and extricate itself from the morass it finds itself in currently.

No one captures the politics of everyday life in the new, shining India as well as Mihir Sharma in his fascinating expose of adman-cum-fixer-cum-bouncer-at-the-gates-of-the-who’s-who, Suhel Seth. The awesome power of networks, the cultivation of friends in high places, the veneer of providing celebrity branding and even the brash and impudent Agony Aunt columns every week make Seth who he is today. And unfortunately, as Sharma says, India what it is today.

*******

Today, India is in a political rut. As the parliamentary logjam continues into its second week, the inane spectacle of MPs trooping into Parliament only to scream at the top of their voices and troop out immediately thereafter, their day’s work having been done, continues to play like a broken record, day after day. One of the MPs, Jay Panda, argues in his piece, that what needs to be done, is to change the archaic rules based on which the Parliament functions. Persuasively argued Mr. Panda, but perhaps looking inwards into the hearts and minds of parliamentarians themselves, may be more useful.

*******

One of the crucial things Parliament should have done instead of log-jamming was to scrutinise the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Rules, 2011, brought out by the government last month. In an alarming sequel to the long drama of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Liability Act, which took place last year, the government has passed a set of rules that fly in the face of Parliament, India’s public policy and good sense. In this piece in the Hindu, I argue why these Rules are dangerous and deserves Parliament’s immediate attention.

*******

Finally, no round-up of India’s national politics is complete without a brief look at Pakistan, our troubled neighbour, when they have had such a momentous week. With the NATO strike killing 24 Pakistani soldiers, and President Obama’s long delay in offering condolences, though not an apology, NY Times columnist Bruce Riedel’s bold argument for a new and revised policy of containment to be followed by the USA in Pakistan seems to be in effect. Riedel argues, in a piece, that is certain to increase in relevance, that the USA must place its need to take out hostile terrorists over its desire to have friendly relations with what he considers to be a duplicitous Pakistani Army. But what about the effects on Pakistani society? Huma Yusuf in Dawn alerts us to the chilling nature of extremism in Pakistan, and how the NATO airstrikes are the latest excuse to rein in individual freedom in Pakistan.

Indians wait and watch.

]]> http://www.criticaltwenties.in/nationalpolitics/politics-critical-digest-6th-december-2011/feed 0 http://www.criticaltwenties.in/nationalpolitics/kashmir-time-for-a-bold-gambit http://www.criticaltwenties.in/nationalpolitics/kashmir-time-for-a-bold-gambit#comments Thu, 21 Apr 2011 11:37:43 +0000 Arghya http://www.criticaltwenties.in/?p=2838

[Ed. note: As a rule, articles on CriticalTwenties are brief, no longer than a thousand words. However, when the issue in question is Kashmir, and the opinion advanced is a roadmap towards a solution, based not on fanciful thinking but realpolitik, the editorial desire for brevity must give way to the understandable need for space to make a persuasive argument. Parag Sayta comprehensively assesses the issues involved and argues why the time to resolve the Kashmir dispute, once and for all, is now.]

With the thawing of Indo-Pak relations following the match that brought the subcontinent to a halt, all the discussion has been about an India-Pakistan bilateral cricket series. It would, however, be a tragedy for both countries if the odd sporting encounter, cultural meeting or prisoner exchange (important as they undoubtedly are) are treated as the sole barometer of improved relations, whereas mere platitudes are mouthed on the core issues: cross border terrorism and Kashmir.

I will argue that from an Indian perspective, the time has never been better to make a bold, comprehensive and all encompassing offer which would help resolve the Kashmir issue. In order to convince doubters, I will address five key issues: Why is status quo not viable? What would be the contours of a solution? Will this solution work? Why is it in India’s interest to take the initiative? Why is now the right time for a serious push?

The Status Quo

Pakistan’s traditional stance has been that since the state of Jammu and Kashmir has an overall majority Muslim population which is also contiguous to Pakistan, it should naturally become a part of Pakistan as the basis of Jinnah’s two nation theory was a Muslim homeland in parts of the subcontinent where the Muslims are a majority. It has therefore tried at various times to forcibly amalgamate Jammu and Kashmir: first through the tribal insurrection (composed mainly of Pashtuns armed by the Pakistan army) in 1948 when Jammu and Kashmir was still an independent kingdom, when it managed to capture roughly a third of the state, then in 1965 through a full scale war which arose because of the Kashmir dispute, followed by another war in Indian Kashmir in 1999 which came to be known as the “Kargil War”. From around 1990 it has also funded an Islamist insurgency composed of both Kashmiri and foreign fighters (especially veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war) which has made the Kashmir Valley into a veritable military fortress. Since the 1948 insurrection when it succeeded in controlling about a third of the state, its attempts to annex Kashmir through force have been thwarted. The Islamist insurgency has been especially painful and bloody for Kashmir itself. The largely peaceful movement in Kashmir where a range of voices were expressed: from autonomy within the Indian Union (through Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference) to independence or union with Pakistan, not to forget several people especially in the Jammu and Ladakh regions who preferred a closer union with India was replaced by the sounds of the gun. Even among some separatists, calls based on the secular, non-sectarian notion of azadi (freedom) were replaced by decidedly violent and Islamist notion of jihad (holy war). The violent retributions have not only been directed against the Indian armed forces and other instruments of state power, but also against the minority Hindu and Sikh populations in the vale of Kashmir, forcing them to flee to Jammu and other parts of India. There have also been Pakistan backed terrorist attacks that have targeted other parts of India. All of this has hardened attitudes in India, vindicating hardliners in India who maintain that any negotiations are futile and made it harder for any Indian regime to make compromises on the issue. Sixty years and four wars (including a two decade long proxy war) later, it has become apparent that Pakistan cannot force a military solution, especially because the last decade has seen the rise in the economic might and political clout of India and a concomitant decline in Pakistan. The proxy war, which initially looked like a partial success has proved costly for Pakistan as post 9/11 the chickens from its madrasa fuelled extremism have come home to roost.

On the other end of the spectrum, Indian nationalists base their assertions on the instrument of accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh which makes the state of Jammu and Kashmir a part of India. This was followed by negotiations with Sheikh Abdullah, the popular and charismatic leader of the National Conference who negotiated a great degree of autonomy for the state within the Indian Union which has been granted to the state under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Besides the legal basis, Indian nationalists also claim that India is a secular country with the third largest Muslim population in the world. So Pakistan’s claim on Jammu and Kashmir simply on the basis of its religious composition is a non sequitur. The problem with this stance is that it simply ignores the ground realities that ought to be obvious to even the most one eyed patriots: there is a palpable sense of dissatisfaction with the Indian State in parts of Jammu and the Kashmir Valley. The status quo with its combination of carrots (through massive economic sops at great expense to the Indian taxpayer) and sticks (at the great cost of the lives of both soldiers and protestors) is simply untenable. Any comparisons with Punjab in the 1980s where a carrot and stick policy worked are incongruous because unlike Kashmir, the Sikh insurgency was a consequence of specific circumstances in the 1980s and the Sikhs had until then by and large been satisfied within India. Moreover, the involvement of an interested third party in the form of Pakistan makes Kashmir an even more complicated issue. It is simply too costly (not to mention morally repugnant) to have a perpetual police state within our borders. Besides the Islamist insurgency I discussed above, the bungling and follies of successive Indian governments and the human rights abuses committed by the Indian armed forces have further hardened attitudes and contributed in no small measure to the vitiation of the atmosphere. Besides, as much as our foreign affairs mandarins may try to obfuscate matters, it is undeniable that a major cause of the festering hatred against India and Islamic radicalism in Pakistan is India’s perceived intransigence on the Kashmir issue.

Status quo is not going to bring about a satisfactory solution. Pakistan cannot hope to forcibly acquire Kashmir, India cannot hope to solve its biggest security and foreign policy challenge which is a political problem by any number of economic sops or the use of force and most importantly, Kashmir itself cannot return to normalcy unless a political solution that is acceptable to all its stakeholders is agreed upon.

The Trodden Path

While both sides have been involved in intense, often bloody periods of acrimony, these have often been interspersed with attempts at dialogue. Ironically, these putative efforts have usually followed the most confrontational periods: thus the negotiations at the United Nations followed the 1948 insurrection; the Tashkent Agreement and the Simla Accord which called for a resolution of the Kashmir issue through bilateral means followed the 1965 and 1971 wars and declared a ceasefire along what came to be known as the line of control; the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 were followed by the Lahore declaration and the Agra summit followed the 1999 Kargil war.

At various stages, Pakistan has argued for a plebiscite in the entire historical state of Jammu and Kashmir encompassing both Indian and Pakistan administered Kashmir. In the minds of advocates of this approach, this would presumably result in a numerical majority voting for union with Pakistan (as the state of Jammu and Kashmir has an overall Muslim majority) which would be binding on the all regions of the state (including the regions of Jammu and Ladakh which have non-Muslim majorities and which may plausibly vote against secession). This claim is based on UN Resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 which call for a plebiscite which would give the people of the state the right to join either India or Pakistan. Pakistan’s claim is also based on the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self determination. Besides the logistical problems associated with a plebiscite in an environment that has long been vitiated by violence, the change in circumstances in the Kashmir Valley and in Pakistan administered Kashmir—including the displacement of Kashmiri Pandits and Sikhs and internal migration into Pakistan administered Kashmir (it must be pointed out that a corresponding change has not taken place in Indian Jammu and Kashmir due to Article 370) have altered the dynamics of a referendum. More importantly, Pakistan’s position misses three key points: first, the wishes of the peoples of Jammu and Ladakh which have separate religious, ethnic and historic backgrounds cannot be ignored. Any forced integration of these parts with a country that is professedly an Islamic state would be well nigh unpalatable. Secondly, the proposed plebiscite does not offer the option of an independent Jammu and Kashmir. Most polls conducted in the Kashmir Valley as well as anecdotal accounts and the opinion of a significant proportion of the separatist leadership (especially the Yasin Malik led Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front) suggest that an independent Jammu and Kashmir would be their preferred solution. A plebiscite may not be regarded as legitimate if this option is not provided and, by most accounts, Pakistan is unwilling to countenance the possibility of ceding control over Pakistan administered Kashmir. If the option of an independent Jammu and Kashmir is provided, there is the very real possibility of there being a three way split in votes, in roughly even proportions between India, Pakistan and an independent Jammu and Kashmir and an ensuing irresolvable deadlock. It also raises very real questions such as the viability of such a landlocked and historically and ethnically disparate region surrounded by India and Pakistan ever becoming a successful independent nation. Thirdly, a solution to the dispute has to be acceptable to the people of the rest of India and no government will agree to Pakistan’s demand for a blanket referendum as that would simply not be a deal that they can sell to the Indian public, especially after the blood, sweat and tears expended by India in fending off Pakistani aggression.

A section of the separatist leadership and even parts of the Pakistan establishment have, at various times, suggested what is known as the “Chenab formula”. Broadly speaking, this speaks of a division of the state along the Chenab river whereby the Kashmir Valley and the Muslim majority districts of Jammu, along with the entire Pakistan administered Kashmir being ceded to Pakistan. The Chenab formula is rejected outright by a large section of secular minded separatists for whom the struggle is based on national and not religious lines. It does not countenance the possibility of an independent Jammu and Kashmir which is what several separatists want. For Indians, it is also strongly reminiscent of the two nation theory in miniature, which most Indians completely reject. The process of forced migration along religious lines is for many Indians, too painful to contemplate. For similar reasons, any variants of the Chenab formula with, for instance, the whole of Jammu and Ladakh going to India and the Kashmir valley being ceded to Pakistan are also unlikely to be acceptable.

Those in the state who actually are in favour of an Indian union (most prominently Mehbooba Mufti’s Peoples Democratic Party and the National Conference) suggest a “healing touch” policy through greater autonomy and complete demilitarization. While many in the Indian establishment prefer this option as it keeps Pakistan out of the picture, ground realities suggest that this solution would not be acceptable to the separatists led by the Hurriyat Conference. Without the acquiescence of the Hurriyat, lasting peace would be illusory. It is also difficult to envisage how demilitarization without separatist support would work: if the Syed Ali Shah Geelani inspired stone pelting protesters return to the streets, it would be impossible for anyone other than the army to control the situation.

For the sake of completeness, I would also like to mention one other proposal proffered by the Indian Right: abrogation of Article 370 which would pave the way for people from other parts of India settling in the state. The proponents of this solution point to the success of China through its “Han-ification” policy in Tibet and are inspired by the Zionist example in Israel. The consequences of this policy being adopted are too grim to bear: look no further than the furore following the decision in 2008 to transfer just 100 acres of land to the Amarnath Shrine Board. Besides the moral vacuousness of breaching the promise of autonomy made to Kashmiris, the only certain consequence of this policy is that the subcontinent would permanently remain in embers.

The Road Map

Given the seemingly intractable nature of the conflict and the unviability of the solutions described above, the best hope for peace is the precedent set in Northern Ireland where the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 between the British and Irish governments has led to more than a decade of peace in what once appeared to be an irresolvable conflict. Broadly, the solution is based on disarmament by various unionist and nationalist militias in the region, free movement of goods and people and a joint mechanism (with the British and Irish governments along with both unionists and nationalists of Northern Ireland) for governance and dispute resolution.

Remarkably, a variant of such a solution seemed to have been within our grasp. In surprisingly candid and frank revelations, both Gen. Pervez Musharraf and ex-Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri have said that in the course of negotiations between 2004 and 2007, a solution was almost agreed upon. The solution is based on four key pillars: demilitarisation, regionalisation, self government and a joint mechanism. Though not stated explicitly in public, the publicly available information on these discussions seems to imply that the solution would not involve any change in the existing territorial borders (i.e. the de facto line of control). The solution would require modification of existing mechanisms on each side of the line of control to accommodate the four pronged approach and not a total start from scratch, allowing for a semblance of continuity.

Astonishingly, large sections of the Pakistani establishment: the army, including its influential chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani (who is also the ex-chief of the ISI and rated by several experts as the most powerful man in Pakistan), the intelligence agencies and politicians including incumbent President Asif Ali Zardari backed the deal. The Kashmiri leadership was also on board and apparently so was the Indian government. The only reason the deal could not go through at that stage was that there were elections in Indian states which delayed the process, followed by anti-Musharraf protests in Pakistan surrounding the sacking of its Chief Justice, which finally scuppered it. The Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008 terminated any chance of resurrecting the deal until now.

Let us examine each of these pillars.

Demilitarisation would involve withdrawal of armed forces from both sides of Kashmir. A necessary precondition would obviously also involve a complete dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan. While not foolproof, it is our best hope for cessation of violence. If the Pakistani establishment, including its army and the ISI is behind the process and the deal is also backed by Kashmiri separatists, then for the first time, we can hope that genuine efforts are made to tackle radical groups as Pakistan would be a stakeholder in the process. There is already a realisation in Pakistan that it cannot hope to counter extremism within Pakistan and help the U.S. fight its war in Afghanistan while allowing groups inimical to India to operate as these groups are fungible. An honourable deal on Kashmir will allow it to act more wholeheartedly against these groups.

Regionalisation involves making the border dividing the two sides of Kashmir ‘irrelevant’ by allowing free movement of people and goods. Surely, this would be unobjectionable to either side. The concern of illegal entry of people or arms is a logistical one as making borders irrelevant does not mean doing away with them. So there will continue to be adequate security arrangements and border checkposts which would not hinder the movement of ordinary people or goods but will keep an eye out for unwanted elements.

Self government would involve an assembly for the entire state which would have the autonomy to make decisions in certain areas allocated to it. Innovative solutions could be proposed here so that the assembly would be in addition to the pre-existing Jammu and Kashmir Assembly each having powers to legislate on predefined areas. The joint mechanism refers to a body comprising of Indians, Pakistanis and all regions of the state which would have the power to decide certain issues. These issues would possibly include very specific subjects like security, water sharing and resolving any disputes that may arise under the deal. Critics would argue that this is an extra-constitutional solution, which goes against the stated Indian position that any change to which a simple retort would be that the Constitution is not immutable. Our core interests are a peaceful solution to the dispute without compromising on our territorial integrity, both of which are achieved.

A Peek into the Future

Significant challenges could emerge for a deal of this nature. On the Pakistan side, a likely scenario is one where a reactionary government or army general who is dissatisfied with the solution takes control and rescinds on the deal. Or the Pakistani government along with separatists ask for greater concessions. Our pre-condition to this deal should be that it is a final settlement to the dispute, with no further grounds for negotiation. In any event, we would always have our fallback option of status quo ante. If the deal falls through due to rescission on the Pakistani or separatist side, we can justifiably, with the moral right and world opinion on our side, get back to our original position. The mere possibility of Pakistanis and/or separatists reneging on the deal in the future should not therefore thwart us from entering a deal in the first place.

On the Indian side, the possibility of a revanchist government assuming power and scrapping the deal is more remote. Trends of the past six decades indicate remarkable perspicacity of the Indian electorate who have elected broadly centrist governments, especially on matters of foreign policy where there has been a continuum. Chances of a rupture are therefore highly unlikely. A more probable concern on the Indian side is if the slippery slope argument comes true. The fear is that the deal might embolden other separatist groups to raise the temperature and get more aggressive in their demands. In such a scenario the Indian establishment and public would develop cold feet and want to renege on the Kashmir deal. I believe that these fears are misplaced. The Indian Union is, in its seventh and most prosperous and peaceful decade, now widely accepted, even embraced by people all over India. The India of today is one of the fastest growing economies of the world which also provides a democratic outlet to meet regional aspirations through its federal structure. In places as disparate as Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Assam, the separatist scourge appears to have been removed. The one genuinely unresolved dispute is Nagaland (some may also add Manipur to this list). Here, the model is not Kashmir (which is unique because of the presence of an interested third party) but other North-Eastern states that have been won over through a combination of autonomy and the promise of a better economic future.

The Good Thing and the Right Thing

The revelations made by Musharraf and Kasuri are so extraordinary, it boggles the mind. What is even more astounding is that the media has failed to give this the coverage it deserves and that the civil society has failed to push the Indian government towards the solution by creating excitement and awareness among the Indian public.

Here is a golden opportunity to solve India’s single largest security and foreign policy challenge without any compromise on our core interests. In return, I believe that this is our best hope to bring the perpetrators of past terrorist atrocities on Indian soil to justice (this could be made a part of the deal during negotiations) and help address some of the long term causes of anti-Indian hatred and extremism in Pakistan. It would also help resolve the single biggest unresolved border dispute on our borders which has been so costly in terms of blood, money and our collective national energy.

Most importantly, I believe that offering a fair resolution to the Kashmir issue is the moral, fair and just thing to do. Given the legacy of our independence struggle and our lofty ideals, it is also the right thing to do.

Do it Now

The disparity between the relative power of the two nations has never been greater. India has delivered an economic growth rate of around 8 per cent over the past decade. By Indian standards, the past decade has also been one of the most stable ones with most parts of the country satisfied with their position in the Indian Union. At the same time, Pakistan has perhaps had the worst decade of its existence. The American war on terror has divided and weakened the country, it is facing the wrath of Islamists at home and suffered floods of biblical magnitude last year. I would argue that this would be the best time for us to strike a deal: our bargaining position is at its strongest, Pakistan is very keen to reach an honourable compromise that it can sell to its people and the separatist leadership appears to be on board, willing to adjust its earlier hardline stance. Put another way, circumstances have conspired to deliver a perfect equilibrium: the Indian government can take this deal to the people and say they brought peace with Pakistan without compromising on India’s security or territorial integrity; Pakistan can show that it managed to strike an honourable deal given its bargaining position and the Kashmiri people can have actual autonomy, virtual reunification and for the first time in decades, the prospect of peace.

The timing is also right because it is not too late within the term of this Lok Sabha to set the process rolling. Indian elections are not due till May 2014, still a good three years away. The government is reeling from corruption scandals and seems bereft of ideas. An honourable resolution of India’s most prickly dispute would be the ideal shot in the arm. The government also comfortably has numbers on its side. The only significant opposition is likely to come from sections of the Hindu Right, but surely, the Indian public is now mature enough to understand that this is not a sell-out of our national interest: if explained properly, it would be relatively easy to convince the Indian public that the deal has not compromised on our core interests and has given peace in the sub-continent a chance. It also must be remembered that the present peace process is a legacy of Atal Behari Vajpayee and we must therefore feel confident that at least a section of the BJP leadership can be brought around to back this deal. So achieving a national consensus on the issue does not seem impossible. In Pakistan, the key protagonists who were agreeable to the deal: Zardari, Kayani and Musharraf are still around albeit in different roles. Like the Hindu Right here, the Islamists might be the one group which opposes the deal, but by now, even the ISI now realizes that the Islamists are not amenable to reason and cannot be allowed to spoil the deal.

Crucially, the taciturn Dr. Manmohan Singh seems as keen as his predecessor to leave a strong legacy on Kashmir. His handling on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal highlighted that when he is really determined to get something done, he has the tenacity to carry it through. His statement on the 18 April gives us some cause for hope. On the legacy he wants to leave behind as Prime Minister, he said: “if I can succeed in normalizing relations between India and Pakistan as they should prevail between two normal states, I would consider my job well done.” Well said, Mr. Prime Minister. Now time for some action.

]]> http://www.criticaltwenties.in/nationalpolitics/kashmir-time-for-a-bold-gambit/feed 5 http://www.criticaltwenties.in/sport/the-ghosts-of-world-cups-past http://www.criticaltwenties.in/sport/the-ghosts-of-world-cups-past#comments Mon, 11 Apr 2011 03:19:09 +0000 Alok http://www.criticaltwenties.in/?p=2765 I have memories only from the 1992 World Cup onwards; when the cricket neurons in my brain were slowly growing and forming connections. That World Cup was an utter and total disaster for India, save for the win over Pakistan (our only win btw). Distinctly remember the last ball thriller against Australia with four needed and Steve Waugh dropping Venkatapathi Raju on the boundary-line but keeping his wits to get the batsmen run out going for the tie. Funnily enough, we were all thrilled to see Pakistan win, because even then “anyone but England” was the dominant feeling.

The 1996 World Cup was when I was probably beginning to understand cricket well enough to *get* the awesomeness of Jayasuriya’s assaults, Lara’s scintillating counter-attack against South Africa, and of course, the biggest…upset…ever (Kenya v WI). Was in the Chinnaswamy Stadium with my grandfather, watching probably the most titanic and emotional India-Pakistan encounter… ever (this year’s semis included) because, with all due respect, somehow, we managed to beat a better team.

The 1999 World Cup was probably the last cricket I saw with my granddad (even if it was just on the tv). Not surprising because he was already three heart attacks down and after the last one, his only request from the doctor was to get him to live long enough to see the 1999 World Cup (of course, in the hope that India would lift it again, but that was not to be). I can’t remember too many matches of this World Cup, but I do remember the feeling in the pit of my stomach during India’s embarrassing collapse against Zimbabwe. I’ve only ever had that feeling once afterwards, and that was when I saw the last over of the 2008 Perth Test Match. It’s the kind that brings stinging tears to your eyes.

The fact that the 2003 World Cup coincided with my AISSE XII Board Exams is neatly reflected in my “performance” in the exams. The match I remember the most is India v England featuring possibly one of the greatest bowling performances by an Indian in ODI cricket. Yes, Ashish Nehra you did write your name on the same wall featuring Anil Kumble and Kapil Dev. Though the match I had most fun watching was probably Australia v Kenya in the Super Sixes as 40 year old Asif Karim bowled one of the all time great spells of spin bowling in ODI cricket: 8.2-6-7-3! Against Australia!!

I have no memories of the 2007 World Cup. I am told that at the precise moment Dhoni was out LBW to Muralitharan playing back to a doosra, a vein exploded so hard in my forehead that the blood rushed into my brain and erased all memories of that World Cup.

You will forgive me if I confess to you that I did not believe India would win this World Cup at any stage. At 150 odd for 5 against Australia I did not believe. With just 260 on board against Pakistan, I did not believe. When Gautam Gambhir charged out of his crease in a stunning brain freeze in the finals, I did not believe. When Dhoni finally stepped out of his crease and set the ball in a long arc over the long on boundary… I still couldn’t believe. Years of under-performance, failure, crushed hopes and broken expectations had taught me to build defences against the inevitable disappointment, and it took me a while to dismantle the defences and embrace the feeling.

By the time I got the feeling though, perspective had reared its ugly head on the horizon, and before I knew it, Anna Hazare was a on a fast-unto-death in Jantar Mantar.

However, if there is one image I will carry from this game, it will be from a genuinely distraught yet bravely smiling Shahid Afridi, at the post-match conference. I honestly admit I never quite liked Afridi. Apart from the fact that he never seemed to move out of his twenties (perhaps a model to follow for all CriticalTwenties authors!), which struck me as incredible, I took an active dislike to him when he, in the India-Pakistan 1999 World Cup game bludgeoned Javagal Srinath and Venkatesh Prasad to all parts of the ground in the early overs of Pakistan’s ultimately unsuccessful run chase. But in the post-match conference, Afridi’s words conveyed a sense of dignity and grace about the man which renders his age manipulations and past cricketing exploits against India, as frustrating as they may have been at the time, trifling.

It is hard enough for him being the Pakistani cricket team captain. Harder still, when the country is an absolute wreck and counts on a grand victory in the Cricket World Cup as respite from its accumulating miseries. And hardest still, when with the weight of these expectations, one captains Pakistan to a devastating loss against the old arch-rival India in the semi-final. Afridi not only bore these onerous burdens magnanimously during the course of the game, but poignantly expressed both his hurt at the loss and his quiet respect for India’s performance at the post-match ceremony.

He hemmed and hawed at the difficult questions on Pakistan’s performance clearly expressing his frustration both at his fielders for having dropped more chances than one can count (“Sachin was lucky”) and at his batsmen’s indiscretion including his own (“we played irresponsible shots”). At the same time, he wished India well for the final as only a genuine sportsman would and apologised to his nation unexpectedly at the end of Shastri’s questions, betraying a deep emotion of having failed in his mission.

Most revealingly, Afridi retained a hint of a smile throughout the post-match conference—a smile of a man who had lost a game but refused to lose his dignity at a time when it was easiest to do so. Long after the dust settles at Mohali, Mumbai and this World Cup, I will carry this image with me—of a beaten captain who lost a cricket game but won something infinitely more valuable- a country’s genuine and heartfelt respect.

But the government had other ideas. In a curious set of incidents which were set in motion by an ordinance which sought to overrule the Supreme Court decision, to a Bill introduced in Parliament in the Budget Session earlier in the week that attempts to respect the Supreme Court decision per se albeit taking away the ground beneath its feet, the government has shown an uncharacteristic zeal in ensuring that property owners across the country, who would be rightful beneficiaries of the Supreme Court order, remain deprived of what is rightfully theirs. It has done this, ostensibly to alleviate the difficulties faced by the Custodian in sustaining his actions under the Enemy Property Act. Though that’s precisely what the implication of the Supreme Court order was—that the Custodian should face difficulties, permanent roadblocks preferably, when it sought to seize and manage properties which were owned by Indian nationals. So why is the Home Ministry keeping up its belligerence in overturning the judicial verdict, and that too with such abstruse reasons? Surely 2000 properties scattered across the country wouldn’t exactly rank as top priority for a Home Minister faced with cross-border terror threats, home grown Naxal lawlessness, Telengana and Gorkhaland statehood demands, investigations into corruption in government, the Supreme Court striking down the CVC appointment… I could go on for a while. But it’s sufficient to realise that there is clearly more to this issue than what meets the eye.

The political charge which accompanies the vexed issue of enemy properties can perhaps be best explained by its moniker. ‘Enemy property’ the term itself, throws up a heady concoction of fervent nationalism, an immediate identification of the other, a not-too-subtle dash of Pakistan, and provides a readily available medium to assert this nationalistic fervour—by seizing properties belonging to so-called ‘enemies’. Add to this the fact of most of the owners of the properties being Muslim, and most of the tenants, purely probabilistically Hindu (I don’t have figures here but approximating from India’s overall demography), and one has a fresh whiff of communal conflagration. A conflagration not in the least helped by the BJP claiming most outcomes which benefit Muslims as ‘minority appeasement’ and the Congress, torn between its hardline Home Minister and several Muslim MPs, doing what it has done best in the UPA-2 government—dithering.

The result of this dithering and the inevitable attempt at a compromise formula is the Enemy Property (Amendment and Validation) Second Bill 2010. By this Bill, the government, while allowing MAM Khan to claim his properties after ‘satisfying the Central government’ that he is a citizen of India by birth (either one is a citizen or he is not, where is the question of subjective satisfaction in this matter?) and the lawful heir of the properties (both of which the Supreme Court has already certified in its judgment), has made it clear that any future divestment of property held by a Custodian, irrespective of its legality, will be only by an order of the central government. No court can in the future, like the Supreme Court did in 2005, order such divestment. At one go, the government has ensured that the court’s wings to perform its job, i.e. uphold the rule of law, in this case, by adjudicating on the rightness or wrongness of ownership of particular properties, have been clipped, while its own discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis which properties can be divested to their rightful owners, or otherwise (to real estate sharks, mall developers and the land mafia) remains unfettered.

The government’s attempt at saving the immediate relief provided by the Supreme Court decision to MAM Khan notwithstanding, its belligerence in legislating on an issue which seemingly does not merit further statutory intervention is a sad reflection on governance in India today.  Not only is it a clear attempt at undermining the rule of law by refusing to allow claimants to property from approaching the Court to reclaim their due, but at the same time it is also symptomatic of a political class which thrives on the politics of hate, of confrontation with Pakistan and skewed definitions of nationalism. Despite decades having passed since the war of 1965 and a decade since the last war at Kargil, the government, by this Bill in 2010 is still seeking revenge for these wars on Indian nationals who migrated to Pakistan during the exigencies of Partition and their present-day Indian heirs. Nothing could be pettier than penalising one’s own citizens for their parents having taken the decision to move to Pakistan. And celebrating the move as an assertion of one’s national identity. Hopefully the government will realise in good time that the Indian Muslims who own these properties are Indians too, as much Indian as the ministers in the government seeking to take away their properties are. And it can start manifesting this realisation by not passing this Bill and consigning the antiquated shibboleth of ‘enemy property’ to the history books, which is where it rightfully belongs today.

And the prospect of a mighty upset, yesterday, was what provided the ongoing World Cup with its first dash of allure. No doubt the track at Nagpur was placid, the English bowling hapless and their fielding disgraceful, but a sparkling batting performance by the Dutch unquestionably provided the delight and the merry that the ongoing tournament has thus far lacked. And by making the chase difficult for England, the Dutch ensured that the game remained tantalisingly poised for much of its duration.

At the core of the Netherlands’ excellence was a marvellous all-round showing by Ryan ten Doeschate, who scored 119 off 100 balls with the bat and just as importantly bowled with purpose and economy, finishing with figures of 2 for 47 from his ten overs. As all-round performances in World Cup games go, this is up there with the very best – the Imran Khans and the Kapil Devs would have been proud of a display of this ilk.

Coming into bat at 58-2, ten Doeschate took eleven balls to get off the mark, but not once during the period did he look ruffled, giving the impression of a man utterly confident of his talents. Once he got rolling, he set about his task with breezy ebullience, displaying a particular proclivity for the cow-corner, repeatedly finding either the gap between wide long-on and deep midwicket or the stands behind the fencing. The innings was by no means chanceless – James Anderson at long-on and Kevin Pietersen at long-off allowed a skier when, ten Doeschate was on 47, to fall smack between them – but it was paced to perfection. There was a time when Graeme Swann and Paul Collingwood operating in tandem allowed the batsmen little leeway to play a forceful shot, but ten Doeschate remained serenely disposed, knowing that his time will come. And when Andrew Strauss brought on Pietersen, in collaboration with his batting partner at the time, Tom Cooper, the off-spinner was ripped apart, taken for nineteen runs off his two overs.

After the loss of Cooper and Bas Zuiderant – one of the survivors from the 1996 World Cup – ten Doeschate began to up the run-rate, striking boundaries as and when he pleased. A flick off Graeme Swann for six over midwicket – easily England’s best bowler of the game – showcased the excellence of his timing and the suppleness of his wrists.

The very best batsmen often appear to possess a lot of time to play their strokes – ten Doeschate is no different, possessing an ability to alter his shots at the final moment. After his partnership of 64 runs with Tom de Grooth came to an end in the first over of the batting power-play, he ensured that the field restrictions did not go unutilised, plundering the English attack with disdainful alacrity. His century came courtesy an overthrow from Jonathan Trott that ricocheted off the stumps onto the boundary – an anticlimactic completion of a glorious landmark. After ten Doeschate fell to Stuart Broad for 119, the Dutch aided by some clever batting from their captain Peter Borren and some inept fielding from the English ended their innings on 292. Borren bowled by Stuart Broad in the 49th over was allowed to stay on the field as England had only three fielders inside the 30 yard circle, an incident that epitomised their dreadful day in the field.

Nevertheless, chasing 293 on a flat deck against a rather feeble bowling attack should have been a simple enough task. But England being England made heavy weather of it, needing fine hands from Paul Collingwood and Ravi Bopara to settle the tie in the penultimate over. The Dutch, for the most part, bowled sensibly, with ten Doeschate again proving the star act. It was his dismissal of Ian Bell in the final ball of his spell that made the prospect of a Dutch victory even more tenable. No doubt England ultimately averted defeat and retained an element of honour, but the prospect at the change of innings in particular – and at various junctures during England’s chase – of an upset, provided the World Cup with a sprinkling of allure that it has desperately required. Sadly, there will be no such charm to look forward to in 2015.

1. South Africa v Australia Semi-finals 1999

Without question, the greatest of chokes in all of World Cup history. Having restricted Australia to a paltry 213 South Africa were odds on favourites to win until a fat blonde bowling leg spin went to work on their minds. A healthy 53/1 was quickly turned into 183/7 when their man of the hour (and ultimate man of the series), Lance Klusener kept his wits and hammered boundaries to drag them closer to victory. Then, with one run needed of four balls, this happened. Watch the video again. You can almost hear the frenzied voices in Allan Donald’s head go off when Klusener hits the ball. At least that is the only explanation one can give for the the initial freeze and then the mad and futile (not to mention, batless) run to the other end for a ball hit straight to short mid on. This match was the ultimate example of why one can never hope to say with a straight face: “Even South Africa cannot lose it from here…”

2. West Indies v Australia Semi-finals 1996

After an up and down tournament West Indies seemed to have finally gotten a golden chance to make the finals again after having upset (who else, but) South Africa in the quarters and needing only 43 runs to win off the last nine overs against Australia in the semis. Oh and they also had eight wickets in hand. That they lost from where will tell you nothing about the brainlessness and stupidity behind their cricket in the next half an hour. Batsman after batsman came in, tried to hit his way out, handed over his wicket… only for the next batsman to come in and do exactly the same. All the while Captain Richie Richardson, stuck at the other end, frantically pleading (practically going down on his knees and begging) with the batsmen to show some sense and hand him the strike. The rest of the West Indian batsmen politely declined.

3. India v Sri Lanka Semi-finals 1999

It is still seen as something of a national tragedy, a great humiliation, etc etc, but take a step back and you’ll realize this one was up there with the all time great chokes of the World Cup. From having the opposition to at 3 for 35 and letting them get to 250, all the way to cruising at 98 for 1 and then collapsing to 120 for 8, this was a choke of ginormous proportions and make no mistake about it. Naturally, the Kolkata crowd were less then amused.

4. South Africa v Sri Lanka Group Stage 2003

I could have filled in half of this list with South African World Cup performances between 1992-2007, but that would be unfair to the less well known chokers of the cricket World Cup. However, it is no great surprise then that South Africa’s Duckworth Lewis Method inspired choke (in front of a home crowd that too) finds mention here. This particular choke is unique in that it is perhaps the only mathematics based choke on this list. One can almost hear the collective howl of rage in the dressing room as Mark Boucher firmly pats back the last ball to Muralitharan confident in the assumption that they have enough to get over the D/L par score. They needed one more. They forgot to tell Mark Boucher.

5. South Africa v Australia Semi-finals 2007

By 2007, even the South African team believed that it was going to choke sometime between the end of the Super-Eights and the finals. They did. In the semi-finals. To (who else, but) Australia. Faced with Glenn McGrath and Shaun Tait, a much vaunted South African battling line mustered all of 149 runs between them and saw the Australians rack up the runs in about 30 overs.

6. West Indies v India final 1983

It’s probably taboo to say it; (but say it I will) India’s one World Cup win came courtesy of a massive choke. See, the West Indies were the form team since about 1975, and in 1983 they were expected to win the tournament again hands down. They too expected to win hands down. Just that they forgot how to. Batsman after batsman kept getting out in the belief that someone after them would get them to the paltry 183 but somehow no one seemed to realize that Viv Richards and Clive Lloyd get to bat only once in an innings. It was the finals, against one of the weaker teams, on a hot streak no doubt, but with Balwinder Singh Sandhu opening the bowling? Come on! They should have won it at a canter.

They didn’t. And the rest is well… you’re living in it now, so you know.

7. England v Australia finals 1987

When you’re cruising to victory in a World Cup final, no matter how rubbish the bowling is, YOU NEVER REVERSE SWEEP. Thanks to England’s almighty choke in this match, everyone knows this sacred maxim. Mike Gatting, on a roll, cleaning up Australia and taking England to a comfortable win, gets a little too comfortable against Allan Border. He decides to reverse sweep gets an edge to the keeper, and like the seasoned World Cup losers that they are, England promptly go on to collapse in a heap. Australia climbed out of nowhere to win the World Cup, and Mike Gatting ate humble pie. Lots of it.

8. Pakistan v Australia finals 1999

Thanks to Pakistan, this mostly unloved edition of the World Cup ended as it began; a damp squib of a contest. After a thrilling semi-final and a resounding Pakistani win in the semi-finals, an almighty clash of the titans was expected. Instead, Pakistan woke up, realized they were in the World Cup finals again, panicked and threw it all away in a limp and spineless display the likes of which weren’t seen…

9. India v Australia finals 2003

… for four years at the next World Cup. In 2003, after a rousing World Cup campaign where India beat all comers (except Australia) the finals against the all-conquering Australia was (once again) touted as an almighty clash of the titans. Except of course, India managed to choke at the toss. A limp bowling and batting display followed but in fact, after Ricky Ponting’s one handed six, we all sort of figured the match was over as a contest.

10. England v India Group Stage, 1999

In front of their home crowd (as defined as those who managed to pass the Tebbit test) England were on the verge of being kicked out of their own party. They needed to win this match against India to stay alive in the World Cup and keep a bit of interest alive. They were up against a team that had itself choked spectacularly against Zimbabwe but had come back strongly to keep their Super-Six hope alive. All the cues were set up for a thrilling game and a close contest. Of course it was a match involving England. Of course they choked. Of course they got kicked out of the World Cup. Even before the official song was released.

11. India v Bangladesh/Pakistan v Ireland group stages 2007

I really couldn’t decide which was the worse choke between the two, but considering the fact that both happened on the same day in the same tournament, I feel compelled (and in the interests of Indo-Pak comity) to jointly hand this place on the list to both India and Pakistan. The tournament format had been changed to give teams an opportunity to get kicked out of the World Cup earlier than before. Guess which teams took this glorious opportunity?

For the Indian fan, the agony of watching India stumble and fumble against Bangladesh was set off by the delight at the sight of the Irish pouring cold Guinness on Pakistani hopes ( I’m sure the opposite was also true for Pakistani fans that day). The ensuing Bangladesh-Ireland Super-Eights match was one more reason the 2007 World Cup will go down as probably the worst ever, thanks to the great sub-continental choke. (This is also perhaps the only choke to be attributed to a coach’s death; one would think Greg Chappell was happy he just got fired.)

As has already been pointed out in painful detail, the World Cup is really not going to get going till we reach the quarterfinals at least, but we can be sure of at least a good choke or two. Will India misunderstand the UDRS, panic and lose by 10 runs? Will Australia finally make their entry into the above list with a performance straight out of this winter’s Ashes? or will South Africa surprise us all… and find a new and hitherto impossible way of choking in the semi-finals? Again?

I can hardly wait to find out.

But I am anything but indifferent to Raktha Charitra, and for some reason have found myself thinking about what this bloody biopic really means for the polity, more so since the events (save for a few exceptions) are broadly true.

Make no mistake; Raktha Charitra is not just a movie with a story that has a neat beginning and a neat end. One gets the sense that Paritala Ravi (or Pratap Ravi in the movie) was someone who went through a systematic process but understood the process better than others. I’ll sort of try and explain what I mean by this in this post.

WARNING:***Spoilers ahead***

From the start, RGV makes it very clear that violence is a way of life in “Anandpur” (thinly disguised Rayalseema). What I have found out from friends and read about Rayalseema does nothing to dispel this notion. This is not violence-as-a-way-of-life in the way of say, Somalia, or Kashmir in the 1990s. Violence here is both lawful and unlawful and, most importantly, normal. Normal, not in the sense of the usual, frequent or ordinary, but in the sense of being the norm. Violence is an expected and accepted response to wrongs and the response to violence can only be violence.

RGV does a great job of conveying this in Raktha Charitra. Two instances stand out. Somewhere, in the second half of the movie, we are told of the story of Babu Qadri whose sister is brutally kidnapped and raped by the main antagonist, Bukka Reddy, causing her to commit suicide. When Babu protests, he is taken to Bukka Reddy who casually tells him that he’ll rape anyone he likes, and goes on to systematically break Babu Qadri’s legs with the butt of a rifle. At the same time as he’s meting out his horrific “punishment” on Babu Quadri, Bukka’s aunt walks past the scene, batting not a single eyelid, casually asks Bukka if he wants to join her on a visit to the temple, and accepts his negative response with less than a shrug of the shoulders. Bukka’s behaviour is not even shocking to her.

At another time, Pratap Ravi is hatching the plot to kill Bukka Reddy with his associates over lunch, while being served by his mother and his wife. As far as his mother and wife are concerned, this is not different from any political, personal or business meeting that Pratap may conduct over lunch. There’s no moralistic objection to violence or revenge. As far as they are concerned, Bukka Reddy’s violence is to be met only with violence, and that is perfectly acceptable.

The violence-as-the-norm view, I suppose, is not a unique point of view that RGV is peddling, or even the context in which he is putting it in (the Telugu film industry thrives and survives on such faction violence), but Raktha Charitra asks a deeper question, namely, is violence all there is, but is there something more? This is especially so, if we compare the characters of Bukka Reddy and Pratap Ravi.

From the start, there seems to be little difference between the two, as far as methods go, and arguably, their ultimate aims go. Both use violence publicly and freely to meet their goals, i.e., the destruction of the other and the gaining of power. The difference however, is seen in their response to Shivaji Rao (Shatrughan Sinha brilliantly channelling NT Rama Rao’s charisma and eccentricity) during the elections. As far as Bukka is concerned, violence is the only way to establish supremacy and seeing a new threat, he attacks him as well, believing that this will dissuade Shivaji Rao from campaigning and challenging Bukka’s hold on the district. Pratap however, sees an opportunity for an ally. More importantly, Pratap recognizes that violence alone will not give him victory over Bukka (nor Bukka over Pratap) and to break the deadlock, he needs to compromise and enter politics on Shivaji Rao’s side.

As far as Bukka is concerned, violence is politics by other means, but Pratap recognizes the difference. As far as Bukka is concerned, fear is the only thing that drives people, but Pratap knows that fear can be trumped by something else; respect. This is also evident in their leadership styles. Bukka’s men obey him because they fear him; Pratap’s because they respect him. Without the ability to terrorize a population, Bukka suddenly seems vulnerable and defenceless, his brutal assassination only a formality for Pratap (or justice, in the case of Babu Qadri). Pratap, on the other hand, enjoys the respect of not only his peers, but his “constituency” as such, something he is schooled in by Shivaji Rao. This allows him to dictate terms to the biggest gang-lords of the city without the fear of repercussion.

Earning the respect of people involves quid pro quo, something that is not possible with fear alone. Pratap solves disputes, gets things done and generally does for his constituents what they want him to do for them. I won’t go so far as to suggest a Nitish Kumar – Lalu comparison, but at some level, Pratap and Nitish Kumar would understand each other. In effect, Pratap is trying to break out of the cycle of violence which perpetuates itself with more killings, revenge killings and revenge killings for revenge killings, and sees entry into politics as a way of doing this. Raktha Charitra Part 1 is essentially the rise of Paritala Ravi as he not only avenges his father’s and brother’s deaths, but also tries to rise above the cycle of violence.

Of course, earning respect later in life does not absolve one of responsibility for the sins committed early on, and Part 2 of Raktha Charitra (releasing this Friday, the 3rd of December) will probably track the fall of Pratap Ravi for this reason alone.

***Spoilers end***

So, what does this mean for our polity? I don’t claim to make a broad ranging argument but just a couple of thoughts I’d like to throw up for discussion:

1.Violence is nothing but a means to an end. Sometimes it is an apt tool, and sometimes it is not. It is as much true of counter-insurgency efforts in Chattisgarh as it is when dealing with Pakistan or Arundhati Roy. Perhaps, in some situations, to paraphrase Isaac Asimov’s saying, violence is the last resort of the fool, but it takes a wise man to figure that out. In this regard, Gandhi’s means-and-ends argument is as much about practicality as it is about morality.

2.It is reductionist to see politics and violence as being two sides of the same coin, i.e., violence is politics by other means. The interaction and interplay of the two is complex and often confusing, but that, by no means renders the two the one and the same. The two can co-exist and thrive in separate fields. For instance, what methods the Myanmarese junta use to control their population would be nothing but violence, but the methods they use to stay in power vis-a-vis each other is not the same. Perhaps the recent sham elections may indeed be an effort to overcome some limitations of the first, and allow the better use of the latter.

I know I’m only using the terms “violence” and “politics” loosely, so students of political science and … violence are requested to look beyond definitional difficulties while commenting.

Or you could just tell us you hated/loved the movie and why.