What makes it the case that modern liberal states should care about someone’s religion? That is rather easy to answer. If it is a necessary duty of the state that it ought to promote the well being of it’s members, it follows that if its members believe that their religion is central to their well being, peace of mind and other such like, the state must have something to say about it. And, more often than not, it should have something positive to say about it. Of course, we limit these instances of positive commendation in certain circumstances; most notably, when certain religious beliefs translate into practices that harm others.
But what has boggled my mind for very long is why a country like India needs to accord a special place to religion? If I have a non-religious belief that is central to my well-being why should that be thought of as any less than having a religious belief to that effect. To put it differently, should the state give people professing a religion or religious institutions special rights that are not accorded to other persons? Let me articulate my worry with the following example – why should colleges that are affiliated with a particular religion be given special rights that no other college has. If I start a college with the professed motive of simply providing quality education to students and helping society by way of research, why should my rights in selecting students be any less than those of, most famously, St. Stephen’s College in New Delhi?
What is so special about religion anyway? Can you clearly articulate what is special about religion qua religion? What is so special about saying that I am carrying out the will of god (Yes, not God) as opposed to carrying out what is ordinarily morally demanded of me. Let me say the following, however: I am not saying that religion is bunk and it should therefore be subjected to special disadvantages. I do think the former, but that is inconsequential.
Now, before you jump up and say that religion is a hot-button issue and therefore demands extra consideration, let me say that that is a contingent factor. When you say that religion should be respected because it is a hot-button issue, you are not saying that the state should respect religion qua religion, you are saying religion should be handled carefully only because it is socially divisive and evokes strong emotions. If there were a non-religious moral commitment that were as central to my well being, as religion is to yours, I deserve to be treated in a manner no less than you and vice versa. Both are questions of conscience, and to distinguish one form of conscience and moral commitment from the other is arbitrary and absurd. I have failed to find anyone who has provided a cogent reason why religion is a special category of demands made upon persons that gives it special significance in the sphere of public reason.
Thus, I have a sneaking feeling that the Constitution violates equality. I know there are many “constitution-defenders” who will question this, but I leave that for another day. Before closing this post, let me add some more masala to the mix – I also think one part of the constitution is in direct conflict with another. Does the right to (extra) freedom of religion (Art. 25, 26) (as opposed to other matters of conscience) conflict with the general right to equality (A. 14)?
Prasan,
I think two issues are intertwined in your post- the legal and the moral. Insofar as the moral place for religion in society in India, it can be given special importance because it is important to people or “a hot button” as you call it. The contingent nature of this reason is immaterial- it’s important to people and so it’s an important marker in society. Of course we can disagree on its importance but that’s an entirely different story.
Insofar as the legal question is concerned, I think the state does, or at any rate is supposed to do two things. First, not interfere with religious practice. Everyone has a claim right to practise, preach and propagate religion of his/ her own choice which incorporates an immunity from state interference. Second, to interfere by way of positive discrimination for religious minorities with respect to cultural and educational rights. The rationale is clearly to ensure that minority institutions, which are set up purely to protect a particular “faith-based” way of life or learning are protected since they are deemed vulnerable to majoritarian pressures. Of course, if there are other such views/ interests which require protection, I’m all for it. That seems to be a better approach than levelling down. So yes, according a special place to religion does have equality implications legally, but at the moment, I see no inequality involved.
Arghya, you have made the same mistake that I had warned against. This is a moral issue, not a legal issue. The legal status is what the constitution says (as interpreted by the SC). The question is – is the legal status justified morally?
It is my contention that if MY moral belief is as important to me as religion is to X, then the state must show equal concern and respect towards my moral belief. The mistake you make is to link religion to social practice. That is not the issue. Social practices may not non-religious. And they may be hot button. Yet they deserve the same attention by the government. Im talking of religion as religion – as a categorical practical demand. This is the same thing as ordinary moral demands.
This is not a question of levelling down at all! And in the end you agree!
You say “Of course, if there are other such views/ interests which require protection, I’m all for it.” This is exactly what I am saying. There are many moral positions that are minority positions. And those will deserve the same treatment as minority religious belief. If everyone can claim to practise religion, then everyone can similarly claim to practice certain things according to her moral belief.
All I mean to say is that there is no distinction to be drawn. What you must do to one, you must do to the other. That is what equality is all about. There is nothing special about religion qua religion.
Prasan, you write: “That is rather easy to answer. If it is a necessary duty of the state that it ought to promote the well being of it’s members, it follows that if its members believe that their religion is central to their well being, peace of mind and other such like, the state must have something to say about it. ” (emphases mine).
First, why is it a necessary duty of the state that it ought to promote the well being of its members? And promote in what sense?
There are many different conceptions of a “modern liberal” state, ranging from the minimalistic libertarian vision of a state that defends people against force and fraud and aggression and interferes no further, to a Rawlsian egalitarian vision where the state’s job is to try to equalise life chances, or at any rate to give the best deal to the person behind the “Rawlsian veil”, to the utilitarian vision where the goal of the state is to maximise the sum of human happiness, which means that it may be okay for the state to hurt one in order to benefit a multitude. Of course, there are totalitarian visions such as fascism and communism, and anarchist visions of no state, but I’m not including them because we’re focusing on what you call “modern liberal” states.
So, even if we agree that a state must in some nominal sense promote the well being of its members, it by no means follows that it must promote their well being in any active sense. If you follow the libertarian vision, for instance, the state should have nothing to say about religion, except in so far as it relates to dealing with violence and terrorism committed with guidance from the words of wisdom in ancient religious texts. On the other hand, if you follow the egalitarian or utilitarian visions, the government may have something to say about religion, but it would probably have stuff to say about what you eat, where and what you study, what you wear, and so on.
Don’t get me wrong. I think what you’ve written is by and large correct. My point is that you massively understate the case against government involvement with religion. If government should be involved in religion, it should also be involved with cricket, cuisine, local languages, fashion styles, Bollywood movies, and many more things. A modern liberal state that goes too far in this direction doesn’t remain much of a modern liberal state for too long.
Vipul, it is great to hear from you after so long!
Let me allay your concern by saying the following: I believe that there there is no better defense of the modern state than on liberal grounds. If a state is “libertarian,” it’s legitimacy, I believe, is far more prone to attack.
Perhaps the use of the the word necessary was unfortunate. I regretted using it after I first typed the post but I hung on. For one reason. If we think that the only legitimate state is a liberal one (and of course there may be other state although not legitimate – a state can exist without being legitimate) then a state that does not promote the well being of its members would perhaps be classified as a failing state.
I will leave the debate of what it means to promote well being for another day. I just think that one necessary but not sufficient part of promoting well being is to allow people to fulfil their life plan. We can argue about what which part of one’s life plan but that again, is for another day. I think that at least one part of one’s life plan is to act according to what we believe moral imperatives are.
I emphasize that I have not understated the case against government involvement. This is a question of rights. It is almost axiomatic that where there is a right, government involvement is circumscribed.
Prasan, my point was just that “liberal” has a wide range of meanings (libertarian, egalitarian, utilitarian being among the main possibilities) and it would help to be clearer about what particular philosophy of the role of government you were endorsing (though not necessarily for the purpose of this post).
I presume you have some sort of hybrid in mind, that includes some conception of fundamental/inalienable rights (libertarian), some concept of making sure there isn’t too much inequality (egalitarian), and some idea of maximising overall prosperity (utilitarian). It’s the libertarian component that provides the strongest objection against the interface of state and religion. The others don’t offer any strong support for state involvement with religion, but don’t offer any particular opposition either, at least at first blush.
I don’t think the first question is easy to answer.
There are many reasons why a liberal state may care about someone’s religion. It also depends on what you mean by “care”. Care can range from “nice to know, keep it up” to “it’s not our culture to be doing these things. Stop now!”.
For the moment we can ignore the intersection between religious and non-religious matters where the State’s interest in religion is balanced (or perhaps over-weighed) by interest in something other, i.e., public health.
But this does bring back the question, why should a modern liberal State care about a citizen’s religion?
I think that unless religion intersects with another consideration of public policy, it is none of the business of the State. To this extent I agree entirely with Vipul above.
I also think that you cannot look at India’s Constitutional provisions de hors Indian political history. Briefly, the provisions you suggest are problematic are actually in place to promote diversity of linguistic and religious groups and to allow such groups to maintain their unique linguistic and religious traditions in the area of education.
Prasan,
This is a slight aside to the debate you’ve been having with Vipul.
You cannot, as Alok says, look at the issue of religion in the Indian Constitution de hors the political compulsions that got them there in the first place. As a “categorical practical demand” I agree with you entirely that it has as much or as little moral significance as say your non-religious moral belief. To that extent, both should be equally protected or kept immune from state interference legally.
In the Constitution, this leaves us with two problems: one that religion as a category is protected and two, of special cultural and educational rights for religious and linguistic minorities. Why religion and language you may ask? Why not gender, province or skin colour? But the question of constitutionalisation is not a question of personal morality alone. It is myopic of you to think that this is the whole story. It is not. Constitutions are the practical products of political give-and-take responsive to issues and concerns that dominate at the time. Religion and language were deemed key markers which could either make or break India at the time. Maybe sometime in the future, sexuality or more probably, economic inequality may be substitute markers. And the Constitution at the time will respond appropriately to the same. So is the place of religion morally justified- no, but subject to the caveat of how narrowly you want to view morality itself. Is it practically justified- most certainly yes.
This blog is turning out to be far more fun than I imagined!
I think I have irked all three of you by using the the words “the state must have something to say about religion.” I must clarify what I meant. I *do not* mean that the state must interfere in religion. My post is not about the interface of state and religion. When Alok says, “I think that unless religion intersects with another consideration of public policy, it is none of the business of the State. To this extent I agree entirely with Vipul above.” I agree. I really had nothing to say about that.
When I used the word care, it is true that these may be a variety of responses. But in my post I emhpasized that all liberal states must adopt a policy where they allow persons to practise their religion – which is what I meant by positive commendation. The state must say, it is good for you to practise whatever helps your well being. And since religious belief is part of your well being, please go ahead. We will not stop you. So when a state does not stop a person from practising her religion, it ‘would’ have shown that care towards the issue, it would have something to say about the issue. That is the whole point about conscience. States must abstain for interfering with the conscience of persons. Strangely we are all in agreement. But it maybe that my words have misled all of you.
About the question of political compulsion – of course. I agree. We can’t look at stuff without a politico-historical context. But we can still, surely, say that it is manifestly unfair that politico-historical circumstances have led to differing treatment of certain types of matters of conscience (religion). I have for long failed to understand the difference between principles and pragmatic “justifications”. I am on dworkin’s side when he says that pragmatism must itself be the product of a certain philosophical view. Pragmatism is not separate from the domain of normative justification. Thus, in my view, and in this case, politico-historical justification just doesn’t cut it. There are absolutely “ridiculous” things in the constitution. “Cow-slaughter”? Politico-historical justifications would tell you that at that time, Gandhi’s influence was so great, and that Hindu’s thought it such a great and important issue that it’s being there in the Constitution is justified. I am not inclined to take such a view.
Prasan,
What makes a religious belief privileged over non religious beliefs? Ontologically and epistemologically perhaps nothing does. May be the Kantian world view deserves just as much respect as the Christian one.
But does this mean that the Constitution morally ought to treat them alike? Consider this: How many Kantians have killed Platonists or demanded a State of their own. Each of these things have happened and continue to happen in the name of religion. Religion is a highly emotive subject and stirs enormous popular passion. Thus there has been felt the need to provide a (Constitutional) guarantee that people are free to follow the religion of thier choice, or not follow any . The ‘justification’ comes not from the privileged status of religious belief but the vulnerability that its brings along with it. If you consider vulnerability as the justificatory basis it helps explain the special status acorded to ‘race’ and in some cases ‘language’ as well.
Doesnt this ‘justification’ satisfy you? Or are you committed to a view that the ‘justification’ could be a proper one only only if it is tied to some special ontological or epistemological priority of the belief in question. What if someday Humeans in some country start getting systematically attacked by the Aristotelian majority of the country and are forced to convert at gun point to Nichomachean Ethics? Should such a day arise I think there you will find the justification to afford privilege to peoples beliefs on Ethics as well.
Shiv,
I must have said something really misleading in the post that so many people have ended up saying the same thing.
Well, I consider 3 points
1. That religion has no special epistemic status as opposed to other moral beliefs. Any distinction on this *reason* is arbitrary.
2. If that is so, the only reason for granting minority religions and or any religion for that matter, *greater* freedom, than other world views, like secular humanism for example, must be because it is a *contingent* feature of societies that religion is a hot-button topic. I emphasized that there is a distinction between religion qua religion, and religion qua social practice.
3. However, that it is a hot-button issue, in my view, cannot bear enough justificatory load to justify *special* protection to religion. People are of course free to follow their religion. But what grounds the fact that people are freeER to follow religion as opposed to something else? Suppose a majority of persons (non-religiously) think that persons from certain religions should not be allowed to build prayer houses, and only secular places of congregation may be built. This might be a hot-button and people may be (over) sensitive to attacks on their secular moral belief. And that a particular law makes this the case. In my view, I would think this manifestly wrong. There is nothing to privilege secular moral belief over religious belief, even if it is hot-button.
You and I both agree on justificatory pluralism, but I don’t think hot-button really cuts it.
CODA
The question about religious violence is irrelevant. That is covered under the harm principle, as I mentioned in the post.
Prasan,
1.Of course the justificatory link I am forging here between religion and special protection to it is contingent. But what is the problem in this link being contingent. Horses for courses. If tommorrow people are attacked for their ideas on Ethics, protect them as well. Lurking beneath your discomfort with this justificatory link being ‘merely’ contingent is the thought that a real justification has got to be true, non contingently- true for all times and all places. But most moral problems are contingent in this way depending for thier very existence on the vagaries of life. I have moral obligations as a father only if I have a child; but how does this contingent fact of fatherhood detract from the nature of the moral requirement.
2. I think you are wrong to argue that people are not freer to follow religion than other belief systems. No Constitution can give someone the freedom to do something.; it can only either protect the freedom or take away the freedom. It cannot enlarge it. ( Hohfeld, Kockureck)You are free to do what you have the natural capacity to do.
Your objection can be restated thus:
People have greater protection for thier religious freedom than they have for freedom concerning other moral beliefs.
But this on my argument is unobjectionable. There is a need for greater ‘protection’ because there is greater vulnerability in case of religious beliefs. There would be a problem if the state discriminates between the vulenrability regarding religious belief and other vulnerabilities. How can you say that the issue of vulnerability is neither here nor there? It is the clincher in this case according to me.
3. I fail to understand your disticntion between religion vs religion as a social practice. Constitutions are practical documents. They concern what is happening. An extinct religon practiced by no one needs no protection. The protection that you are objecting must then actually pertain to the ‘practice’ of religion. The issues I underline those are those concerning the practice of religion.
I agree with Shiv that certain justifications are contingent. I am not uncomfortable with contingent moral problems. But my question is how does the contingency relate to the protection afforded. And I agree about the Hohfeldian point. I should have not used the words that I did in that regard.
So lets come back to the question of contingency. You say that it is *because* religious beliefs are vulnerable that they should be afforded special protection. One, not all religious beliefs are vulnerable. I find it hard to believe that Hinduism is vulnerable. Moreover, ordinary moral beliefs are as vulnerable if not more. Atheism?
But how does vulnerability relate to *greater* freedom (because the state allows greater freedom to be exercised)? I would imagine vulnerability would translate into ensuring that no one may stop a religious institution from creating an educational establishment in its own name. Interpersonally, this is dealt with the harm principle. If between state and citizen, the state must simply allow them to do so. And this maybe constitutionally mandated. But why is that denied to everyone else? That is my question. Greater protection need not mean that greater freedom be allowed to be exercised, but rather that restrictions are imposed on every other institution and person from interfering with the exercise of that freedom. The connection between greater protection and the special rights of A. 25 and A. 26, where there are any, is tenuous.
The area of free action guaranteed in the constitution cannot be greater for some moral beliefs and not for others.